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Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 17349 
This is an action commenced by the plaintiffs against 
Defendants for an alleged financial loss to Plaintiffs' 
businesses located in Vernal, Utah caused by Defendants' 
actions in protesting the condition of the Uintah County-
Vernal City Dog Pound by instituting a campaign allegedly 
discouraging tourism in Vernal City and Uintah County. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable David Sam granted Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and entered a Judgment of no cause of 
action in favor of Defendants. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the lower court decisi~. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A review of the record filed before this Court and the 
"Statement of Facts" submitted by Appellants in their brief 
shows that such "Statement" contains distortions of the tr~ 
facts, innuendos which are not justified, and further omits 
much of the evidence which was before the lower court at 
the time the Sununary Judgment was granted. While it is true 
that this Court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the appellants for purposes of reviewing a 
Sununary Judgment, it is also true that the entire record 
must be examined including evidence submitted by both 
sides of the controversy. Brady v. Fausett, 546 P.2d 246 
(Utah 1976). For this reason, Respondents shall restate 
the facts in their entirety with the purpose of presenting 
a complete and objective recitation of the lower court 
record. 
The Humane Society of Utah, contrary to Appellants' 
assertion, is not affiliated in any way with any other 
national organization. It has been formed for the purpose 
of protecting animals and preventing cruelty to them in 
accordance with various state and local laws. As early as 
-2-
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1971 the Humane Society requested the Uintah County 
Commission and Vernal City Council to improve the jointly 
owned facility located near Vernal, Utah which was used 
for the impoundment and destruction of dogs. (R. 151). 
From 1971 through 1975 it is uncontradicted that various 
contacts were made between the Humane Society and government 
officials of both Uintah County and Vernal City. (R. 151-152). 
On February 22, 1974 a letter was written to Uintah 
High School by an agent of the Humane Society of Utah 
describing the conditions of the pound which was maintained 
by the city and county. The letter stated that animals 
were being executed by a sheriff who would sit on the 
tailgate of an automobile and shoot at the animals located 
in the wire enclosures until each was hit. (R. 148-150). 
On August 5, 1975, Thomas Little, the executive director 
of the Humane Society, sent a letter to Jack Allred, a 
city councilman of Vernal City, and stated the following: 
Pursuant to our phone conversation the other 
day, please find enclosed two copies of a letter 
that was mailed to every resident of Cedar City 
plus all media. In the case of Vernal and Uintah 
Counties, we would place emphasis on tourists not 
missing the freezing, filthy little sheds in 
Dinosaur Land's sewer plant, etc., etc. Please 
advise of the city and county's attitude. I leave 
October 1st, and will require two weeks to prepare 
and submit news releases, mailing, etc. (R. 154). 
No action was taken by the Humane Society at that time in 
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spite of the fact that 47 animals had to be euthanized 
due to distemper contacted at the pound. (R. 152). 
On February 11, 1976 the Humane Society's chief inves-
tigator visited the pound and found eleven animals had 
died as a result of insufficient shelter and that several 
animals were in need of care due to the surrounding 
environment. He concluded that the animals were being 
confined in a cruel and illegal manner (R. 143-144, 146, 
152). The Humane Society contacted the Uintah County 
Attorney who declined to prosecute the Uintah County 
Commission or the Vernal City Council for the maintenance 
of the pound on the basis that the members were "immune" 
from any action. 
Shortly after the discovery of these dead aminals, 
a campaign was instituted by the Humane Society to attempt 
to eliminate the conditions existing at the pound. On 
February 14 through 18, 1976 commercial air time was 
purchased on the local radio station in Vernal and each 
commercial was aired six times a day. This commercial 
stated the following: 
Eleven animals experienced barbaric deaths 
in one twenty-four hour period at the Vernal-Uintah 
County Pound. The death of these animals can be 
attributed to the unconscious, brutal attitude of 
your local officials. This responsibility must be 
-4-
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shared by the residents of the Uintah Basin. 
Refusal to accept assistance and cooperation 
from the Humane Society over the past six 
years has an effect on all life including 
yours. The Humane Society of Utah will take 
every action available to rectify the disgrace 
of the bullet-riddled tin shacks used as a 
pound in Vernal. We ask your help in supporting 
us. Contact your officials today. (R. 133). 
A newspaper ad was placed in the Vernal Express on 
February 19, 1976. This ad stated the following: 
WANTED, an answer from your council and 
commission. Your commissioners and councilmen 
were responsible for the deaths of eleven animals 
in one night. There is little question they are 
in violation of Utah criminal statutes. The Humane 
Society of Utah has been trying for five years to 
get the people of Vernal to build a decent, humane 
animal pound to replace the disgraceful tin shacks 
you see here. The responsibility for the welfare 
of all your animals must be shared by every resident 
of Uintah County. What is your answer? The Humane 
Society of Utah, 4613 South 4000 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84020, 298-3548. (R. 145). 
On February 20, 1976 a meeting was held between the 
Humane Society and Utah Attorney General Vernon Romney. 
It was the Humane Society's position that the Uintah County 
Attorney had wrongfully refused to prosecute the government 
officials for maintenance of the pound. The Attorney General 
concluded, however, that such a decision was discretionary 
with the County Attorney and was not within the power of 
the Attorney General's office. (R. 134, 145). 
In March of 1976 a single billboard was erected at 
-5-
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33rd South and 600 West in Salt Lake City which stated 
the following: 
Dinosaur Land--Don't miss the bullet-riddled 
shacks--See pets swelter in the heat and freeze 
in the cold--Visit city-county pound--Vernal--
Paid for by the Humane Society of Utah. (R. 134). 
In conjunction with this billboard several interviews 
were conducted by news media with agents of the Humane 
Society. Copies of some of these news reports are con-
tained in the record. (R. 139-141) . During several inter-
views defendant Johnson was asked whether he felt the 
erection of the billboard by the Humane Society would have an 
adverse effect on tourism in Uintah County. Johnson stated 
that he hoped so in order that there would be pressure put 
on local officials to make the needed and necessary pound 
improvements. 
On March 17, 1976 plaintiff filed this action in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Uintah County alleging 
that he had been injured by the conduct of defendant Lonnie 
Johnson in discouraging tourists from entering Vernal City 
and asking for damages of $250,000 caused from such loss. 
It should be noted that this suit was commenced in less 
than thirty days from the time the first campaign was 
begun within Vernal City itself. 
In a subsequent interview on the date the lawsuit was 
-6-
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filed, Mr. Johnson stated, "If Mr. Searle is really 
interested in enticing tourism in the Uintah Basin, my 
suggestion would be to clean up the pound. There is nothing 
malicious about our advertising. It just states the facts 
and I am willing to back that up in court." (R. 133). 
Since the appellants have attempted to completely 
distort the attempted removal of this case to Federal Court, 
it is necessary to briefly address this procedure. 
(Appellants' Brief pp. 5-6). On April 7, 1976 Lonnie 
Johnson filed an action in the U.S. District Court to remove 
the case from the state court on the assumption that this 
Court's decision in State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (Utah 
1975) expressly held that the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution did not apply to the states through the enact-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore Defendants' 
claim of First Amendment privilege would not be recognized 
in the state court. (R. 23-25). 
Judge Willis Ritter granted Searle's Motion to Remand 
back to the state court on the basis that the state "Complaint" 
did not present a claim or right arising under the Constitution, 
treaties or laws of the United States. (R. 63). The lower 
Federal District Court held that the First Amendment defense 
asserted by defendant Lonnie Johnson did not permit removal 
-7-
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to the Federal District Court since the Searles' Complaint 
was not based upon federal constitutional or federal law. 
A second action was filed in the Federal District 
Court for a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Federal 
Civil Rights Act. It was again claimed that the decision 
of this Court in the Phillips case precluded the assertion 
of the First Amendment right as a defense in the state 
action. Appellant Searle opposed this action also and 
specifically stated that Respondents' First Amendment 
rights would be adequately protected in the state court 
proceeding and that the Phillips case has not been followed 
by this Court as evidenced by subsequent decisions. (R. 206-
208). The lower Federal District Court dismissed the 
declaratory judgment action without comment. (R. 205). 
It should be noted that the lower Federal District 
Court made no ruling whatsoever as to the merits of the 
case or as to the defenses of constitutional privilege 
raised by respondent Johnson. The rulings were simply 
that the defenses asserted by Respondents could not be used 
as a means of gaining entry into the Federal Court system 
when the plaintiffs' Complaint itself did not contain 
federal or constitutional affirmative issues. 
Respondent Lonnie Johnson asserted numerous defenses 
-8-
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in the state court action against Plaintiffs' Complaint including 
improper venue, truth of the matter asserted, privileged 
communication, First and Fourteenth Amendment privilege, Utah 
State Constitution privilege, and failure to specify special 
damages. (R. 13-17). 
Respondent Lonnie Johnson sought a Motion for Change 
of Venue on the theory that an impartial trial could not 
be held in Uintah County since a claim was made that the 
entire economy of the county had been injured by the 
publicity generated by Respondent. (R. 19-20). The Motion 
for Change of Venue was denied by the lower court on July 
15, 1976. (R. 121). 
In November of 1977 defendant Lonnie Johnson moved 
for Summary Judgment on the basis that the actions complained 
against by Plaintiffs were privileged under the First Amend-
ment right of freedom of speech and that Plaintiff belonged 
to too large a class to maintain a suit. (R. 176). At that 
time an affidavit was filed by Lonnie Johnson which stated 
the following: 
(1) That Lonnie Johnson was the executive 
director of the Humane Society of Utah which was 
a non-profit organization created for the prevention 
of cruelty to animals; 
(2) That at all times Johnson was acting in 
the public interest and in furtherance of the 
stated purpose of the Humane Society; 
-9-
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(3) Any action on the part of Johnson con-
cerning the pound or tourist trade was motivated 
by a desire to influence the elected officials 
of Vernal City and Uintah County to make needed 
changes in the dog pound; 
(4) Any statements made concerning the 
condition of the dog pound was based upon Johnson's 
personal observation or upon reports by agents of 
the Humane Society; 
(5) At no time was Johnson acquainted with the 
plaintiff or any of his businesses and at no time 
did Johnson hold any ill will to plaintiff or 
intentionally seek to damage him. (R. 191-192) . 
A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of Plaintiff 
by Demar Dudley who stated that he had heard Lonnie Johnson 
on a Salt Lake radio station in which Johnson urged the 
radio audience to boycott Vernal and not to vacation or 
use the tourist facilities. The affidavit further stated 
that Johnson expressed his intention to damage financially 
and economically the residents of Vernal, Utah engaged in 
the tourist business. (Tr. 228). In addition to these 
affidavits, both parties had submitted Answers to Interroga-
tories prior to Defendants' Motion which contained their 
various theories of action and defense. (R. 132-155; 
156-165) . The Motion of Defendant for Summary Judgment 
was denied by the Honorable Allan B. Sorensen on December 
21, 1977. (R. 245). 
Throughout the proceedings Plaintiffs filed three 
-10-
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Amended Complaints ultimately adding some eight more 
plaintiffs and the Humane Society of Utah as a defendant 
in addition to modifying the claims and damages being sought. 
(R. 6, 160, 388, 465). 
In August of 1979 this matter was set for trial before 
the Honorable David Sam. After two days of attempting to 
empanel an impartial jury the lower court granted Defendants' 
Motion for Change of Venue and ordered the matter be trans-
ferred to Utah County. (R. 414). 
On July 7, 1980 Defendants moved for Summary Judgment 
once again based upon recent federal court decisions 
involving similar cases. The positions of both parties were 
extensively briefed and on July 29, 1980 the lower court 
issued its ruling. The court stated in its minute entry: 
The Court has examined the pleadings on file 
herein and the recent ruling of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Missouri 
v. NOW, Docket No. 79-1379 and finds under the allega-
tions of Plaintiffs' Complaint and the law applicable 
to those allegations that there is a First Amendment 
defense which bars Plaintiff's claim since Defendant's 
actions were politically motivated and not initiated 
for any anti-competitive, commercial or economic purpose. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant's activities 
are privileged on the basis of the First Amendment 
right to petition and in recognition of that important 
right even though it conflicts with commercial efforts. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, 
no cause of action. (R. 471). 
An order reflecting this ruling was signed by the 
-11-
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lower court on August 12, 1980. (R. 1-2). It is from 
this order that the present appeal is taken. (R. 4 72). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The Action of Defendants to Petition a Government 
for Political Change is an Absolute Right Under the United 
States Constitution and Utah Constitution in the Absence 
of a Showing That Such Action is a "Sham". 
The lower court in its ruling stated the following: 
[U]nder the allegations of Plaintiff's 
Complaint and the law applicable to those 
allegations • • . there is a First Amendment 
defense which bars Plaintiff's claim since 
Defendant's actions were politically motivated 
and not initiated for any anti-competitive, 
commercial or economic purpose. Accordingly, 
the Court finds that Defendant's activities are 
privileged on the basis of the First Amendment 
right to petition and in recognition of that 
important right even though it conflicts with 
commercial efforts. (R. 471). 
Appellants maintain that the lower court erred in this 
ruling and that the right to petition for political change doe 
not confer an absolute First Amendment right on the petitioner 
but only confers a conditional right which must be proven unde 
the circumstances of each case. (Appellants' Brief pp. 16-18) 
Thus, under Appellants' reasoning the common law tort of 
interference with contract comprises the substantive law 
and the First Amendment privilege of petitioning constitutes 
only a defense to the violation of this law. 
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The position taken by Appellants it totally without 
merit. As will be examined, the United States Supreme 
Court and numerous other federal courts have held that the 
First Amendment right to petition for a political change is 
paramount and superior to all federal and state statutory 
and common law. Only in rare instances in cases involving 
a "sham" can this right be defeated by application of state 
and federal law. For this reason, the ruling of the lower 
court was correct in finding an absolute right existed in 
the instant case. 
1. The "Noerr Doctrine" and Subsequent Cases. 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states the following: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances. 
Likewise, Section 1 of Article I of the Utah Constitution 
states a similar principle: 
All men have the inherent and unalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberty; 
to acquire, possess, and protect property, to 
worship according to the dictates of their 
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest 
against wrongs, and petition for redress of 
grievances; to communicate ~reely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse 
of that right. 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Thus, both the United States and Utah Constitutions 
clearly give citizens the right to petition their government 
for grievances and to corrununicate freely their thoughts. rt 
is fundamental that these rights should not be restricted 
except in instances where a clear abuse of these rights 
has occurred. 
The landmark case decided by the United States Supreme 
Court concerning the right to petition governments for 
change is Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). In Noerr a lower federai 
district court found liability pursuant to the antitrust 
laws against the defendant railroad which had conducted an 
extensive campaign to bring about legislation directed 
against the railroad's chief competitors, the long-haul 
truckers. There was evidence that the campaign was aimed 
at destroying the truckers as competitors and that the rail-
roads had employed a widespread publicity and lobbying 
effort which was found to be highly deceptive. The federal 
appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed. 
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment right 
to petition the government for the redress of grievances 
barred any interpretation of the Sherman Act to impose 
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liabilities for the railroad's activities. Specifically, 
it held that the Act could not be applied to such activities 
"Insofar as [the activities] comprised mere solicitation of 
governmental actions with respect to the passage and 
enforcement of laws." 365 U.S. at 138. This principle 
was irrespective of the railroad's motives or unethical 
methods in exercising the constitutional right. 
Although the truckers did not base their complaint 
on the conunon law tort of interference with contractual 
or business relations, the truckers argued that the rail-
road's campaign was intended to and did injure the truckers 
with their customers and other public relations. The Court 
held that such injury was incidental to the railroad's attempt 
to influence governmental action and therefore no liability 
could attach. The Court stated the following: 
[To hold for the truckers] would substantially 
impair the power of government to take actions 
through its legislature and executive and operate 
to restrain trade. In a representative democracy 
such as this, these branches of government act on 
behalf of the people and to a very large extent, 
the whole concept of representation depends upon 
the ability of the people to make their wishes 
know to their representatives. Id. at 137. 
The Court then noted that the Sherman Act was subordinate 
to the First Amendment right of petition: 
To hold that the government retains the 
power to act in representative capacity and yet 
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hold, at the same time, that the people cannot 
freely inform the government of their wishes 
would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to 
regulate, not business activity, but political 
activity, a purpose which has no basis whatever 
in the legislative history of that Act. Secondly, 
and of at least equal significance, such a 
construction of the Sherman Act would raise 
important constitutional questions. The right 
of petition is one of the freedoms protected 
by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, 
lightly impute to Congress an attempt to invade 
these freedoms. Id. at 138. (Emphasis added). 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized, however, that if a 
campaign is designed not to change government policy but 
solely to eliminiate competition then such activity is not 
constitutionally protected. The Court stated: 
There may be situations in which a publicity 
campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing 
government action, is a mere sham to cover what is 
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor and the Sherman Act would be justified. 
But this certainly is not the case here. No one 
denies that the railroads were making a genuine 
effort to influence legislation and law enforcement 
practices. Id. at 143, 144. 
The Noerr doctrine was later re-asserted in the subse-
quent case of United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 
657 (1965). The court there stated: 
Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted 
effor~influence public officials regardless of 
intent or purpose. The Court of Appeals, however, 
would hold the conduct illegal depending upon proof 
of an illegal purpose . . . [This holding is not] 
permitted by Noerr for the reasons stated in that 
case. Joint efforts to influence public officials 
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do not violate the antitrust laws even though 
intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct 
is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of 
a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman 
Act. Id. at 670. 
In 1972 the court recognized the "sham" exception in 
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 
U.S. 508 (1972) and found that the activities of the 
defendant in alleged government petition was merely an effort 
to eliminate a competitor with no real purpose in changing 
existing legislation. 
Appellants attempt in their brief to assert that the 
Noerr doctrine and subsequent case law concerns only an 
exception to the antitrust law and that somehow a corrunon 
law tort of interference with contractual relations is not 
affected by this doctrine. (Appellants' Brief pp. 19-23). 
This argument is completely without merit as is evidenced 
by several court decisions in which it is clear that First 
Amendment rights transcend both federal antitrust laws 
and state corrunon law. 
One of the best examples of application of this 
principle is found in Sierra Club v. Humboldt Fur, Inc., 
349 F. Supp. 934 (D. Cal. 1972). In that case the Sierra 
Club had petitioned the United States government to declare 
certain areas as wilderness. A company which had entered 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
into a contract with the U.S. Forest Service for logging 
in that area filed a complaint against the Sierra Club 
alleging state law liability for interference with an 
advantageous contractual relationship. The complaint 
alleged that the Sierra Club had intentionally, willfully, 
and wrongfully induced the United States to breach the 
contract with the company by asserting administrative appeals 
and that such actions resulted in the loss of the contract. 
On a motion to dismiss filed by the Sierra Club based 
upon First Amendment right of petitioning the government 
for redress, the court granted the motion on the basis that 
the company failed to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted. 
The court in granting the motion made the following 
observation: 
The Supreme Court has never had occasion to 
decide what effect the right to petition the 
government has upon corrunon law tort actions that 
might be brought against those who damage the 
interest of others in the exercise of this right 
(the right to petition the government for a redress 
of grievances). This Court believes, however, 
that the Supreme Court has outlined the applicable 
principles of law in its cases dealing with the 
relationship between the First Amendment and def ama-
tion and in cases interpreting the Sherman Act 
as inapplicable to those who conspire to bring 
about government action. Id. at 936. 
The court noted first that the New York Times v. Sullivan 
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case, 370 U.S. 254, extended the First Amendment guarantee 
of free speech to the common law tort of defamation. The 
court stated that liability under common law defamation can 
only be imposed: 
[W]hen what appears to be an attempt to 
discuss matters of public interest is a "sham" 
in that the speaker knows his statements are 
false or speaks with reckless disregard of 
whether they are true or false. Importantly, 
the Court recently made it absolutely clear 
that absent this "sham" use common law "malice" 
is irrelevant to a person's right to speak freely 
without fear of liability. Rosenbloom v. Metro 
Media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, n. 52 (1971). Id. at 937. 
The Sierra court then examined comr.ion law torts in 
relation to the Noerr doctrine formulated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The court stated the following: 
This Court agrees that when a suit based on 
interference with advantageous relations is 
brought against a party whose "interference" 
consisted of petitioning a government body to 
alter its previous policy, a privilege is created 
by the guarantee of the First Amendment. This 
Court, however, does not believe that privilege 
should depend upon malice. For the reasons given 
by the Supreme Court in Eastern Railroad President's 
Conference, supra, this court is persuaded that 
all persons, regardless of motive, are guaranteed 
by the First Amendment the right to speak to 
influence the government or its officials to adopt 
new policy . Id. at 938. (Emphasis added). 
The court rejected a "malice" standard and instead stated 
that "liability can be imposed for activities ostensibly 
consisting of petitioning the government for redress of 
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grievances only if the petitioning is a 'sham' and the 
real purpose is not to obtain governmental action but to 
otherwise injure the plaintiff." Id. at 939. 
Several other cases have recently supported these 
principles that an activity to influence government policy 
is absolutely protected in the absence of showing that 
such activity was for the sole purpose of injuring or 
destroying a third party and was therefore a "sham" 
attempt to petition the government. 
The case closest factually to the instant case is 
State of Missouri v. National Organization for Women, 467 
F. Supp.289 (D. Mo. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 
1980). In that case the National Organization for Women, 
Inc., (NOW) organized a convention boycott against all 
states that had not ratified the proposed Equal Rights 
Amendment. One of the states toward which the boycott 
was directed was Missouri. The state consequently brought 
an action in parens patriae for all of its citizens and 
businesses injured because of the actions of NOW. The 
state sued under the federal antitrust laws, state anti-
trust laws, and state common law tort theories including 
interference with contractual relations. 
The lower court found that the motivation of NOW in 
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organizing the boycott was to make a symbolic gesture and 
to attract attention of the public to the issue of ratif i-
cation. The court further found that NOW intended that the 
adverse economic impact of the boycott on those who would 
otherwise profit from conventions in Missouri would cause 
those persons to influence their legislators to support 
ERA ratification. The court found that the boycott was not 
intended as a punitive measure against Missouri for its past 
failure to ratify and that it was not motivated in any way 
by anti-competitive purposes since NOW was in no way competing 
with Missouri or its citizens. Finally, the lower court 
found that the boycott was non-commercial in that its parti-
cipants were not business interests and its purpose was 
not increased profits and furthermore that the boycott was 
"non-economic, as it was not undertaken to advance the 
economic self-interest of the participants." 467 F. Supp 
at 293-296. 
The conduct complained of by Missouri was NOW's activity 
in organizing a concerted effort to encourage businesses 
and groups not to utilize the facilties of the state of 
Missouri for the holding of various types of commercial 
and non-commercial conventions. NOW contacted numerous 
organizations, conducted a wide-spread publicity campaign, 
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and did everything possible to influence groups from 
entering those states which had not ratified the ERA. 
The lower court found the efforts of NOW were effective 
in that approximately $9,000,000 of convention revenue 
was lost to the state of Missouri because of the economic 
boycott. 
The lower district court found in favor of NOW both 
as to the antitrust claims and as to the state tort claims. 
The lower court found the Noerr doctrine precluded federal 
and state antitrust liability since the campaign of NOW 
was politically motivated and was not a mere sham to cover 
up an attempt to interfere with the business relationship 
of a competitor. In fact, the court noted that none of 
the parties could be considered competitors. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the anti-
trust aspect of the case by stating the following: 
NOW appears to have utilized its political 
power to bring about the ratification of the ERA 
by the state of Missouri. The tool it chose was 
a boycott, a device economic by nature. However, 
using a boycott in a non-competitive political 
arena for the purpose of influencing legislation 
is not proscribed by the Sherman Act. 620 F.2d 
at 1315. 
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's 
dismissal of the state anti trust claim on the same overriding 
principle. Id. at 1316. 
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The state tort claims for interference with contract, 
the same claim now asserted by Appellants in the instant 
case, were also considered by the lower federal district 
court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The lower 
district court stated the following with reference to the 
economic tort claim: 
In this case economic pressure is being 
utilized in a good faith effort to influence the 
ratification of an amendment to the Constitution. 
In these circumstances, the interest sought to 
be advanced by NOW and especially the constitutional 
interest involved in protecting NOW's ability to 
exercise its right to petition and right to 
political association outweigh the interest in 
protecting the business expectancy involved. If 
NOW's actions were not a legitimate effort to 
influence the legislature, this Court would be 
presented with a different case. Under the 
particular facts of this case, the Court finds 
that NOW's convention boycott activities are 
privileged and therefore not actionable in court 
under Missouri law. 467 F. Supp.at 305-306. 
(Emphasis added) . 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the state 
tort claim dismissal and specifically found that only in 
those instances where a "sham" petitioning effort was being 
made to eliminate a competitor could liability be imposed. 
The court reviewed the Noerr doctrine, subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions, and the Sierra Club decision, supra, and 
stated the following: 
We agree with the Sierra Club court and 
find sufficient support in Noerr anJ the subse-
quent cases of the Supreme Court which refer to 
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Noerr to support the conclusion that the right 
to petition is of such importance that it is not 
an improper interference even when exercised by 
way of a boycott. 602 F.2d at 1317. 
Thus, the courts in the NOW case concluded that the 
Noerr doctrine was not limited solely to controversies 
involving the antitrust laws but was much broader by pro-
hibiting any interference with the right to petition and 
seek change of government under any state or federal 
theory in the absence of showing that such effort was not 
legitimate and was in fact a "sham". 
Other federal cases support the absolute right 
granted for seeking political change. In First National 
Bank of Omaha v. Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis, 
482 F. Supp. 514 (D. Minn. 1979), aff 'd, No. 80-1043 (8th 
Cir., Sept. 9, 1980) a suit was brought by one bank seeking 
to restrain an out-of-state bank from engaging in a bank 
credit card program. The lower court granted defendant's 
motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint both as to federal 
banking laws, antitrust laws, and state tort law. The 
Federal District Court of Minnesota in dismissing the state 
claim of interference with business relationships again 
cited the Sierra Club decision and held as a matter of law 
that the activities of the defendants were protected by 
the Noerr doctrine. The court then stated: 
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Several recent cases have stated that while 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine evolved from anti-
trust claims, the First Amendment rights that it 
protects apply equally to other claims including a 
claim for tortious interference with business rela-
tionships . . . . The court agrees with this analysis 
since to hold otherwise would effectively kill the 
defendants' First Amendment rights. Id. at 524-525. 
(Emphasis added) . 
In Pennwalt Corp. v. Zenith Laboratories, 427 F. Supp. 
413 (D. Mich. 1979) an action was brought under the federal 
antitrust laws and numerous other state and federal laws 
for unfair competition and trademark infringements. The 
court dismissed those claims involving the efforts of one 
of the manufacturing drug companies to sue or to threaten 
suit against various customers of a competing drug company. 
In dismissing the claims the court stated: 
While the Noerr-Pennington doctrine evolved 
from antitrust claims, the First Amendment rights 
that it protects are equally applicable to each of 
the other claims made by Zenith. As in antitrust 
cases, these are not absolute rights, but as dis-
cussed, nothing in the allegations made by Zenith 
would bring any of these claims within the "sham" 
exception to these First Amendment rights. For 
this reason, all of the remaining counterclaims 
are dismissed. Id. at 242. 
In the recent case of Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. 
Waldman, 1980-2 Trade Cas. •63,627 (D. Pa. March 21, 1980) 
the Federal District Court of Pennsylvania held that where 
service station attendants had shut down their service 
stations for a three-day period to protest the Department 
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of Energy's policy in profit margin there was no violation 
of federal or state anti-competitive laws. The court held 
that a boycott was a form of political expression and 
therefore protected by the First Amendment. In so holding, 
the court observed: 
The dealers could obviously ban together and 
present a written or oral demand . . to enforce 
existing regulations and laws . But the 
dealers had been doing that with little or no 
apparent success. It might reasonably be that 
the only means of effective expression was the 
boycott. For us to hold that they must have 
continued to rely upon strictly written and oral 
conununication would be to deny them what may have 
been their only effective means of conununication 
arousing public sentiment. This we will not do. 
Finally, the case of Henry v. First National Bank of 
Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979) is also relevant 
in determining whether liability can attach for a political 
boycott effort. This case began in the 1960's when a group 
of blacks organized boycotts against white merchants. 
Actions were brought under state statutes and state common 
law which prohibited secondary boycotts, restraints of trade, 
unlawful conspiracies, and tortious interference with 
contracts. 
Damages in excess of $3,000,000 were sought for the 
economic harm done to the merchants during the boycott. 
The state trial court found in favor of the state and the 
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merchants and the decision was affirmed by the Mississippi 
Supreme Court. 
An action was later brought in the federal district 
court to enjoin enforcement of the state court's judgment. 
The lower federal district court ordered an injunction be 
entered. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the 
propriety of the lower court's injunction. The black organi-
zation claimed that the damage award was unconstitutional 
since it prohibited and penalized activity protected by 
the First Amendment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
dealing with the likelihood of success on the merits in 
the issuance of the injunction stated the following: 
Consistent with the views underlying its 
injunction, the state court assessed the state 
defendants for all damages suffered by the state 
plaintiffs during the period of the boycott which 
the court found attributable to the failure or 
refusal of black citizens to trade with the white 
businesses in anticipated numbers. 
At the heart of the chancery court's 
opinion lies the belief that the mere organiza-
tion of the boycott and every activity under-
taken in support thereof could be subject to 
judicial prohibition under state law. This 
view accords insufficient weight to the First 
Amendment protection of political speech and 
association. 
There is no suggestion that the N.A.A.C.P., 
M.A.T. or the individual defendants were in 
competition with the white businesses or that 
the boycott arose from economic interest. On 
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the contrary, the boycott grew out of a racial 
dispute with the white merchants and city 
government of Port Gibson and all of the 
picketing, speeches, and other communications 
associated with the boycott were directed to 
the elimination of racial discrimination in the 
town. This differentiates this case from a boycott 
organized for economic ends, for a speech to 
protest racial discrimination is essential political 
speech lying at the core of the First Amendment. 
Id. at 303. 
The principles outlined in the preceding cases clearly 
establish that the lower court was correct in its conclusion 
that the activities of defendants in the instant case were 
protected and were not subject to liability. 
2. Legal Standards Applied to Facts of the 
Instant Case. 
The Noerr doctrine and the subsequent cases decided 
under this doctrine clearly hold that unless it can be 
established that an activity for governmental change is 
actually a "sham", such activity is constitutionally 
superior to federal and state statutory law as well as 
state conunon law. In the instant case, there can be no 
doubt from an examination of the pleadings in this case and 
the evidence submitted by the parties that no such "sham" 
exists and that the efforts of defendants were a legitimate 
effort to change the attitude and policy of the Vernal City 
and Uintah County governments. 
The plaintiffs themselves throughout the four Amended 
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Complaints consistently stated that the purpose of 
Defendants' campaign was to cause political change. 
Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint 
states the following: 
Defendants' campaign to interfere with and 
destroy the tourist business in Dinosaur Land, 
Utah, is motivated by their personal, political 
and other beliefs relating to city and county 
government in Vernal City and Uintah County and 
are not related to Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs' 
businesses. Defendants, nevertheless, have 
attempted to interfere with and destroy the 
tourist business in Dinosaur Land in which 
business Plaintiffs are engaged and by which 
they make their living. Defendants' motives 
were to destroy or interfere with the tourist 
business as a means of imposing their views of 
government on Vernal City and Uintah County offi-
cials. (R. 467). (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the plaintiffs themselves admit that the campaign 
instituted by Defendants was a legitimate effort to protest 
the conditions at the pound and to influence the governmental 
officials in instituting change. The facts previously stated 
support this conclusion unequivocably. 
Since 1971 the Humane Society attempted to bring about 
a change in the deplorable conditions existing at the Vernal 
City-Uintah County dog pound. Numerous letters were written, 
meetings were held, and even a warning of an adverse 
publicity campaign was given to the Vernal City Council 
some two years before the campaign was instigated. 
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When the dead animals were discovered in February 
of 1976 an all-out campaign was begun by the Humane Society. 
This campaign, however, did not merely consist of encouraging 
a boycott of tourist businesses but initially consisted of 
an effort to inform the citizens of Vernal and Uintah County 
of the conditions which existed at the pound. Numerous 
radio ads were broadcast in Vernal City and a full-page ad 
was run in the Vernal City and Uintah County newspapers. 
These corrunercials and ads were directed solely at the 
citizens of Vernal and Uintah County who were asked to 
contact their respective government officials to protest 
the conditions existing. 
The billboard which was placed in Salt Lake City did 
not discourage tourists but instead asked them to "Visit 
the City-County Pound in Vernal" and to see the "bullet-
riddled shacks". 
The corrunents made by defendant Lonnie Johnson as to a 
tourist boycott were only an incidental part of the overall 
campaign. Johnson stated that he hoped that people would 
protest to the governments of Vernal and Uintah County 
including a boycott of those entities until such time as 
the conditions had been corrected. Thus, any effort by 
Defendants to discourage tourists to the Uintah County 
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Basin was only a portion of the overall campaign which 
had been launched to effectuate change in the city and 
county governments. 
There has never been any contention by the plaintiffs 
that the effort of the Humane Society was not in fact to 
modify the conditions at the pound. It has never been 
contended by Plaintiffs that Defendants sought to eliminate 
the Vernal businesses for some competitive gain or advan-
tage. It has never been claimed that Defendants competed in 
any way with the businesses of Plaintiffs or other 
businesses in Uintah County. 
Thus, under the Noerr doctrine, in the absence of a 
showing that the purpose of the "boycott" was a sham, the 
conduct of Defendants is absolutely protected. The Sierra 
Club case graphically pointed out that when an organization 
is seeking government change through legitimate political 
activity the fact that other parties are economically harmed 
does not give rise to either statutory or common law 
liability. 
The NOW case involves almost identical motives and 
factual situations. In NOW the purpose of the activity 
was to promote the ratification of the ERA amendment. In 
the instant case, the purpose of the activity was to upgrade 
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the conditions existing at the governrnentai dog pc:.:n~. 
Appellants contend that the actions of Defendants 
seeking a change in the dog pound is not entitled tc +-h -
...... c 
same type of protection of a group seeking a co:-isti tut1:::=.~ 
amendment. (Appellants' Brief p. 23) . Appella:-its have "::;::=. _ 
doubts" as to whether the activities engaged in b~· Cefe:'.C.=.::.:; 
constitutes an exercise of First Amendment right, a:ld "·~·:-.e::-.=.: 
the actions sought to be extracted by Defendants were eve:: 
political in nature". (Appellants' Brief p. 24). Sud·_ a 
statement is nonsensical. It is not a function of courts 
to determine the relative merits of the cause of an orga:'.:z=.-
tion or to decide whether one cause is worthy of protecti.::;:: 
while another one is not. It is clear that in both the 
NOW case and the instant case a change was being sought 
the legislative bodies of both entities. 
In both cases economic boycott was urged to protest 
the conditions existing in the communities in which cha:-i::;e 
was being sought. NOW encouraged outside orga:lizations :'.:: 
to book conventions in Missouri. Defendants encouraged 
tourists not to visit Uintah County. In both cases eccn::i:-:: 
harm to the community was being sought to press:.:re tl:e :::::·:;;:~-
mental officials in making the requested changes. 
Appellants contend that the XOK case is i:-iappropri.a:e 
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shop." (~ppellants' 3::-ie: p. 22). ~~~e::a~-:.s asser~ t~at 
a 11 seco:-idar~- boycctt 11 ·,,..·as i:J.st:.tute2. a:;a:.nst the ~lair:ti±:::s 
and. that no Fi=st .;_~.e:";.:i.-:-.e::-:. ~ri,:i:e9'e is -... -a::-=a::ted. 
(Appellants' Brief p. 22). ;__::. exa.::-.i::a -:_:_c:-. o:: the XO'i·~ case, 
ho,.-e\·er, shows that this argc:.."".l.ent is tctally ,.-i-chc».:t :::erit. 
First, the state sued in parens patriae en behalf of 
all of its citizens and businesses which had been injured 
by the boycott. T~us, the ef::ec~ ~as :-io di::erent than 
had Cintah Cour..ty er \"ernaJ.. City sued on beha.:.f cf the 
plaintiffs in the instant case. 
Second, the sa.-::e argu.-::ent cf secondary boycott was 
raised in the :\Qi·; cou:::::t and "as categorically rejecte::! by 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. ~ust as in the instant 
case \\-·here A:;,ppellants clai:::. that -t~ey ~-e~e the "'target" for 
the boycott, (Appella:lts' Brief p. 31 t'.1.e state of Missouri 
clained that the "targe~· of that tcycott were the businesses 
relying upcn con\·e:itior: tr a.de. ~he Court of Appeals stated 
the following with regard to these argli!':'.ents: 
Fu::::-ther, the fact·.:a.:. setting ... -r:ich ~lissouri 
decicts as tt.e ::ac~g::-o:.:nC. to its "seco:i.dary bcycott 
th~o=\- 11 i:;::o!:"es ::~e c2st:.;.re o= t:ie case. ~lisscuri 
paint~ th~ ~ict~re ~~~s: ~C~~ is ~it~ho:ding all 
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convention business from the Holiday-Johnson Motel 
(HJM) until HJM goes to its legislator and convinces 
its legislator to vote for the ratification of the 
proposed ERA. This characterization of the facts 
protrays HJM as the target of NOW's boycott. The 
target of the boycott was not HJM; it was the state 
of Missouri. 
We find Missouri's focus on the facts of this 
case, and not the district courts--misleading. The 
district court's view is more appropriate for the 
issues at hand. NOW's boycott was directed against 
states that had yet to ratify the proposed ERA. 
NOW was aware that such a boycott would work against 
the public's economic interest; NOW was hopeful 
that the public's interest would suffer to the 
extent that the public would be persuaded that 
ratification of the ERA was "desirable;" NOW wanted 
the public to influence the legislature to ratify 
the ERA; NOW operated on the presumption that 
legislators act with regard to the public interest. 
620 F.2d at 1312-1313, n. 12. 
Similarly, the record shows without question that it 
was the intent of the defendants to put pressure on the 
public in Uintah County for them to in turn pressure the 
various county and city governments to effectuate change. 
At no time were the businesses of Plaintiffs or any other 
businesses the "target" of Defendants' efforts. Rather, 
all efforts were directed towards the political entities 
which could change the conditions at the dog pound and 
internal and external pressures which could be applied to 
such entities were utilized as tools for the change. 
Therefore, a close analysis of the instant case as 
compared with the NOW decision in the lower court and the 
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Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals shows a remarkable similarity 
and shows that the same claim now being made by the 
plaintiffs, i.e., an interference with contractual relations, 
was soundly rejected on the basis of the Noerr doctrine. 
The decision in the recent Crown Central Petrolum 
case is equally applicable. The appellants in the instant 
case have claimed that Defendants had "many lawful avenues 
open to them by which they could petition the local govern-
ment entities to seek desired changes in the dog pound." 
(Appellants' Brief pp. 22-23). This statement both ignores 
the previous five-year effort to effectuate such change 
and also ignores the right of Defendants to choose whatever 
means they believe is most effective to accomplish their 
goal. As the court in the Crown Central Petroleum case 
noted the Noerr doctrine allows a group to arouse public 
sentiment in any reasonable manner and a court cannot say 
that one means of communication is preferable to another. 
Finally, the Henry v. First National Bank of Clarksdale 
case is also applicable to the instant situation. In that 
case black organizations instituted boycotts against merchants 
to eliminate racial discrimination in a southern town. Even 
though merchants guilty of discrimination and innocent of 
discrimination were both equally harmed, the court held that 
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thev could not recover for the economic loss sustained 
as a result of an effort to politically change the 
environment existing in the community. Likewise, the 
fact that townspeople, merchants, or taxpayers were 
indirectly harmed by any supposed boycott by tourists of 
the Uintah County area is not actionable when such efforts 
were purely political in nature and were not directed to 
causing economic harm to eliminate competition. 
Appellants' suggestion that the actions of Defendants 
can be likened to the illegal holding of American citizens 
by Iran is both absurd and offensive to the fundamentals 
of American values. (Appellants' Brief pp. 21-22). To 
compare the holding of hostages with the imposition of 
economic pressure points out the flawed logic used by 
Appellants throughout their brief. If this were indeed 
the case then many Americans from those of the Boston Tea 
Party to consumers boycotting non-union lettuce are guilty 
of holding others "hostage". In addition, all labor unions 
would be "guilty" of picketing and striking their employer 
"hostages". 
In summary, therefore, it is the position of Respondents 
that the record before the lower court including the pleadiM5 
of the plaintiffs themselves clearly establish that the 
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campaign to improve the county and city dog pound was poli-
tically motivated and was in no sense a "sham". As such, 
therefore, under the Noerr doctrine and other decisions cited 
above, the defendants were absolutely privileged in their 
conduct and Plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be main-
tained under any theory of state or federal statutory or 
common law. 
B. Even Assuming Arguendo the Action of Defendants 
to Petition a Government for Political Change is Only 
Conditionally Privileged, Plaintiffs Have Failed to Prove 
"Malice" as an Essential Element of Their Prima Facie Case. 
1. Applicable Legal Standards for Interference 
With Contractual Relations. 
As the appellants have noted in their brief there is 
no Utah case specifically recognizing the doctrine of inten-
tional interference with prospective economic advantage. 
(Appellants' Brief pp. 10-12). It is Respondents' position 
that this Court need not decide at this time whether such 
a doctrine should be adopted in Utah since the Noerr defense 
previously mentioned precludes liability under all state and 
federal statutory and common law theories. Thus, since there 
is no liability as a matter of law there is no need to decide 
whether the interference with prospective economic advantage 
doctrine exists in Utah since that question should never 
be reached. 
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However, assuming ~rg_!:lendo that this Court declines to 
adopt the Noerr doctrine of granting absolute immunity in 
absence of a sham effort to petition a government for change, 
then Respondents submit that AppeJlants have still failed to 
prove the necessary elements of their case even assuming that 
the doctrine of intentional interference with prospective 
economic advantage is adopted in Utah. 
Section 766B of the RP?tat:_e_~~nt___of Torts is generally 
accepted as the foundation for the doctrine of interference 
with prospective economic aovantage. This Court in Soter 
v. Wasatch Development Corp., 443 P.2d 663 (Utah 1968) 
recognized similar elements required in order to prove 
interference with an existing contract. This Court stated: 
In order to estab' sh a right to recover on 
such a cause of action the plaintiff would have 
to show that the defendants, without justification, 
by some wrongful and malicious act, interferred 
with the plaintiff's right of contract, and that 
actual damages resulted. Id. at 664. 
It is the obligation of the plaintiff in an action 
for interference with prospective economic advantage to 
prove, as part of the p_r:_im~ !acie case, a lack of justifi-
cation or privilege on the part of the defendants. As stat~ 
by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Bahleda v. Hakison 
Corp., 323 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1974): 
The presence of a privilege is not an affir-
mative defense, rather, the absence of such a 
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privilege is an element of the cause of action 
which must be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff. 
Id. at 121-122. 
See also, Smith v. Ocean State Bank, 335 S.2d 641 (Fla. 1976); 
Pocketbook, Inc. v. Walsh, 204 F. Sup~ 297 (D. Conn. 1962); 
Harver v. Ohio National Life Ins. Co., 390 F. Sup~ 678 
(D. Mo. 1974); Middleton v. Wallichs Music and Entertainment 
Co., 536 P.2d 1072 (Ariz. App. 1975); and American Hot Rod 
Assn., Inc. v. Carrier, 500 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1974). 
The authorities are also uniform in holding that a 
person who peaceably pursues his own interests is not liable 
for interference with others' contractual obligations unless 
his actions reach the threshhold of tortious conduct. As 
stated by the authority Prosser in his Treatise: 
No case has been found in which intended 
but purely incidental interference resulting from 
the pursuit of the defendant's own end by proper 
means has been held to be actionable. With intent 
to interfere the usual basis of the action, the 
cases have turned almost entirely upon the defendant's 
motive or purpose, and the means by which he has 
sought to accomplish it . . . . Some element of 
ill will is seldom absent from intentional inter-
ference; and if the defendant has a legitimate 
interest to protect, the addition of a spite 
motive usually is not regarded sufficient to result 
in liability . . . . In general, it may be said 
that any purpose sufficient to create a privilege 
to disturb existing contractual relations, such as 
the disinterested protection of the interests of 
third persons, or those of the public ... will 
also justify interference with relations which are 
merely prospective. Prosser on Torts, 4th Ed. at 
951-954. (Emphasis added). 
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As stated by the New York Superior Court in Rosenberg 
v. Del-Mar Division, 391 N.Y. Supp.2d 452 (1977): 
With regard to the tort claim, summary judgment 
was properly granted. As a general rule, interference 
with the business relations of another is not actionable 
unless unlawful means are used or the actor's sole 
motive is to injure the plaintiff. Plaintiff failed 
to adequately demonstrate the existence of either 
requirement as a bona fide factual question. Id. at 
453. (Emphasis added). 
Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court stated: 
One may lawfully induce another to refrain 
from having business relations with a third person, 
although it injuriously affects such third person, 
provided his action be to some legitimate interest 
of his own, and no definite legal rights, such as 
contract rights, are thereby violated. Davis v. 
Lewis, 487 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1972). 
It is generally held that in a tort action for inter-
ference with cont:act the plaintiff must show "actual malice" 
on the part of the defendant in order to prevail. As noted 
by the Illinois Supreme Court: 
As previously mentioned, both parties agree 
that actual malice must be shown in the instant 
case; in addition, both agree that ill will alone 
is not enough to establish actual malice and that 
there must be a desire to harm, which is independent 
of and unrelated to a desire to protect the acting 
party's right and which is not reasonably related 
to the defense of a recognized property or social 
interest. Arlington Heights National Bank v. Arlington 
Heights Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 229 N.E.2d 541, 
518 (Ill. 1967). (Emphasis added). 
Respondents submit that a case involving a claim of 
interference with a prospective business relationship or 
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contract involve the same requirement of "malice" as does 
a claim of defamation or libel. As stated by the California 
Court of Appeals: 
Justification in inducing breach of contract 
is closely analygous to privilege in defamation. 
Under Civil Code Section 47 a publication is privi-
leged if made in any official proceeding authorized 
by law . . . . It seems obvious that in order for 
the commissioner to be effective there must be an 
open channel of all communication by which citizens 
can call his attention to suspected wrongdoings. 
That channel would quickly close if its use subjected 
the user to a risk of liability for libel. Similarly, 
here the tort of inducing breach of contract cannot 
be used to dam up the open channel of communication 
through which citizens may express their grievances 
to public officials and challenge expenditures of 
public funds. Bledsoe v. Watson, 106 Cal. Rptr. 197, 
200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). 
This Court has always held in cases of slander or 
libel that it is the burden of the plaintiff to prove 
actual malice which is spite, ill will, or hatred before 
an action can be sustained. Combs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 
228 P.2d 272 (Utah 1951); Tanner v. Pillsbury Mills, 281 
P.2d 391 (Utah 1955). 
As to matters of public interest this Court held a 
special high standard applies: 
It is firmly established that matters of public 
interest and concern are legitimate subjects of fair 
comment and criticism, not only in newspapers, and 
in radio and television broadcasts, but by members of 
the public generally, and such comrn~nts a~d criticism 
are not actionable, however severe in their term~, 
unless they are made maliciously . . . . Ogden Bus 
Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1976). 
(Emphasis added) . 
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It is likewise proper to grant summary judgment when 
the pleadings and affidavits on file clearly show that a 
claim of malice, implied or in law, or abuse of privilege 
cannot be made. This Court stated as early as 1933 the 
following rule concerning the granting of summary judgment 
in defamation cases: 
The question of whether a qualifiedly privileged 
article is written or published with malicious motive 
or otherwise is generally speaking, a question of 
fact to be determined by the jury. However, in the 
absence of proof that such communication was published 
with actual maiice, it is within the power and duty of 
the courts to say as a matter of law that the motive 
of the publication was without malice. Williams v. 
Standard Examiner Publishing Co., 27 P.2d 1 (Utah 1933). 
(Emphasis added) . 
In the KSL case, supra, this Court quoted from a New 
York decision in which summary judgment was granted in a 
defamation case in which no malice could be shown. The 
New York court stated: 
This Court accordingly concludes that plaintiffs' 
allegations of actual malice, in their complaint, and 
in opposition to this motion, are insufficient, and 
fail to raise triable issues of fact. Under the cir-
cumstances, summary judgment dismissing the complaint 
is the appropriate remedy. 551 P.2d at 226 quoting 
Commercial Programing Unlimited v. Columbia Broad-
casting Systems, Inc., 367 N.Y.S.2d 986. 
Numerous cases have held that summary judgment was 
proper in instances in which the public interest was being 
pursued in claims of libel or slander. In Safrets, Inc. v. 
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Gannett Co., Inc., 361 N.Y. Supp 2d 276 (N.Y.S.C. 1974) a 
pet store owner brought suit against a newspaper and others 
alleging damages because of statements contained in a 
newspaper article concerning the plaintiff's treatment of 
animals. Addressing the issue of privilege, the court cited 
cases dealing with constitutional privileges as defined by 
the United States Supreme Court. The court then stated: 
We must decide whether the offending article 
here involved a question of general public interest 
or concern under Rosenbloom . . . . However that may 
be, we find that this article dealing with humane 
treatment of animals and birds, or conversely, 
prevention of cruelty to them, involves a subject of 
general concern . . . • There is no evidence 
here that the article was published with knowledge 
that it was false. Id. at 280-281. 
The court granted summary judgment to the defendant newspaper 
and acknowledged that the freedom of speech as to matters of 
public interest afforded a privilege to a person commenting 
on the inhumane treatment of animals. 
In Hahn v. Andrello, 355 N.Y. Supp. 2d 850 (N.Y.S.C. App. 
Div. 1974) an action was brought by an attorney against a 
councilman who for alleged defamation made when the councilman 
criticized the legal work done by the attorney with reference 
to problems involving the city dump. The court found that 
the attack went to the profession and business qualifications 
of the plaintiff but noted that the defamation involved matters 
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of public interest--namely an ordinance relating to a city 
dump. Because of this fact, the court stated, it was 
necessary for the plaintiff to prove and plead actual malice 
and failure to do so resulted in a dismissal of plaintiff's 
complaint. 
In Cole Fisher Rogow, Inc. v. Carl Ally, Inc., 228 N.Y. 
Supp. 2d 556 (N.Y.S.C. App. Div. 1968) an action was commencec 
by an advertising agency for libel and slander arising from 
an advertisement which was inserted in opposition to that of 
the agency's client and which was critical of the type of 
advertisement used by the client. The plaintiff claimed 
business loss from the defamatory statement. The court held 
that the privilege of criticizing public affairs extended to 
advertisements and that actual malice was required for the 
plaintiff to prevail. The court stated: 
Plaintiff itself, would seem to negative any 
claim of actual malice when it asserts the advertise-
ment was used in an effort to defeat the opposition--
a legitimate device for use by a competitor. Id. at 
564. 
In the case of Moresi v. Teche Publishing Co., 298 So.2d 
901 (La. Ct. App. 1974) an action was brought against a 
newspaper for an article allegedly defaming plaintiff's 
beach area by saying it was not fit for recreational purposes. 
The plaintiff sought damages for the loss of revenue caused 
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by the business deterioration. The court concluded that 
the article dealt with a subject of public concern, namely, 
the use of public land. The court then stated: 
Therefore, it is probable, that as a matter 
of law, these articles relating to a matter of 
public interest enjoy a constitutional privilege 
under the First Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States. Even if the articles were 
defamatory, and we have concluded they are not, 
plaintiff could not recover for any damage to his 
business resulting therefrom without showing that 
the articles were false and were printed maliciously 
with a reckless disregard for truth. Id. at 906. 
The preceding cases from Utah and other jurisdictions 
illustrate that matters of public interest concerning speech 
require protection of the highest standard--a showing 
of actual malice. It should be noted that several of the 
cases previously referred to involve claims made by persons 
and businesses for loss of business income. In these cases 
it was still required that actual malice be proven. 
It should make little difference, for example, whether 
a person publishes or speaks in a meeting and states that 
an amusement park is unsanitary or whether he states at 
the meeting that he is encouraging all people not to patronize 
the amusement park because it is unsanitary. In both cases 
the damage to the plaintiff would be the same. The first 
case, however, would involve defamation and the second case 
would involve tortious interference of prospective economic 
advantage. 
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Certainly, if the matter is of sufficient public concern 
the standard of actual malice should be applicable in either 
case. The definition of "actual malice" has been stated by 
the United States Supreme Court as publishing a statement 
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard 
of whether it was true or not. The defendant must entertain 
serious doubt as to the truth of the statement made. New York 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); and St. Amant v. 
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). 
The preceding discussion illustrates the correctness of 
the lower court's decision even if it is assumed arguendo 
that the Noerr doctrine of absolute inununity does not apply 
in this case. The following discussion focuses upon these 
legal standards as applied to the facts of the instant case. 
2. Legal Standards Applied to Facts of the Instant 
Case. 
If this Court chooses to recognize the tort of inten-
tional interference with prospective business advantage it 
is incumbent to also define the elements required. One of 
the essential elements necessary in any such case is a showing 
by the plaintiff of an improper motive or no justification. 
This in turn requires a showing of actual malice in the 
actions taken by the defendants. 
Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint 
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states that "Defendants' campaign to interfere with and 
destroy the tourist business in Dinosaur Land, Utah is 
motivated by their personal, political and other beliefs 
relating to city and county government in Vernal City and 
Uintah County, and are not related to Plaintiffs or Plain-
tiffs' businesses." 
The "beliefs" referred to by Plaintiffs in their Com-
plaint are clearly within public interest and concern 
Section 76-9-301 (U.C.A.) which provides that a person 
commits cruelty to animals if he fails to maintain necessary 
food, care, or shether or confines an animal in a cruel 
manner. There can be no serious doubt that the humane care 
of animals is a subject of social importance and public 
interest. As stated in the plaintiffs' own Complaint, the 
sole motivation of Defendants in making the statements and 
in conducting the campaign was to influence the actions of 
the elected officials. 
There is nothing in the file to show that the statements 
made by Defendants were done in a reckless manner. The 
affidavit of Lonnie Johnson shows that all statements 
concerning the conditions of the pound were made from the 
investigation of Johnson himself or from investigations of 
Humane Society agents. There is no showing that statements 
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concerning the pound were made in disbelief of the truth. 
Likewise, there is no showing that the defendants bore any 
ill will toward the plaintiffs or attempted to injure them 
economically for any selfish or competitive gain. 
The most that can be said from the file as it now exists 
is that the actions of Defendants were taken in the hope that 
economic pressure could be brought about by Plaintiffs and 
other citizens of Uintah County against the elected officials 
to effectuate the change in the dog pound. Such conduct and 
motivation can hardly be said to be the "malice" which is 
required to establish a lack of justification and improper 
motive necessary for a prima facie case. 
Respondents submit that except for the bare allegations 
contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint of improper motive and 
lack of justification, there is not a single bit of evidence 
contained in the file to show that the statements made by 
defendant Lonnie Johnson in his affidavit are not correct. 
(R. 192) . As such, the lower court was justified in ruling 
as a matter of law that the actions taken by the defendants 
were not improper and were justified and that therefore 
Plaintiffs' prima facie case could not be proven. Just as 
in defamation cases, in the absence of proof of such malice, 
summary judgment is proper. Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc., 
-48-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
551 P.2d 222 (Utah 1976); Denman v. Star Broadcasting Co., 
497 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1972). 
In conclusion, the record before the district court 
after four years of litigation showed that the defendants did 
not act with a reckless disregard for the interests of the 
plaintiffs nor did they act with ill will intending to harm 
the plaintiffs. The record showed from Plaintiffs' own 
pleading that Defendants acted for a social interest in the 
protection of animals and therefore a finding of actual malice 
could not be made which would establish the prima facie case 
of the plaintiffs. The lower court properly granted summary 
judgment even assuming arguendo that only a conditional 
privilege existed. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue involved in the present case is one beyond the 
immediate facts. While Plaintiffs assert that they have been 
economically damaged by the actions of Defendants, the inverse 
could just as easily be asserted by Defendants, i.e., that the 
right to attempt social change has been injured by the filing 
of this lawsuit by Plaintiffs. Does the U.S. and Utah Consti-
tutions which guarantee free speech and the ~ight to petition 
governmental change permit the stoppage of these political 
rights by the filing of lawsuits based upon tort theories 
developed for the protection of economic abuse? 
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The answer to this question is found in the Noerr doc-
trine and the subsequent decisions interpreting this doctrine 
All state and federal statutory and common law actions must 
yield to First Amendment rights so long as the efforts being 
made do not constitute a sham where the real motive is other 
than seeking political change. To grant a cause of action 
to Plaintiffs in the instant case where there is no doubt 
that such a sham does not exist, is to effectively chill any 
effect of legitimate groups in the future to seek political 
change. In effect, such groups would always be subject to 
suit by some member of society who could claim injury because 
of the hoped for political change or injury from merely the 
attempt to change. Economic boycott has always been a legi-
timate method in American history to encourage such change 
and should not now be prohibited because of alleged indirect 
economic harm. 
This Court has never recognized the tort of interference 
with prospective business advantage. Respondents submit that 
this case does not require such a determination because of thi 
absolute right existing under the Noerr doctrine. However, ir 
the alternative, if such tort is recognized the finding of 
"malice" must also be recognized as essential to a prima ~ 
case. Here, the record is barren of any such malice and the 
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lower court was justified, just as in defamation cases, 
to grant judgment as a matter of law. 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
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